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       Abstract 
In this paper, the variation of support of the Russian annexation of Crimea through a socio-
economic context is explored in both the Crimean Peninsula and mainland Russia. Previous 
literature demonstrates that many aspects of society, such as political freedom, economic 
prosperity and cultural protection were promised within the Crimean Peninsula, but not 
necessarily carried out by the Russian administration. The citizens of Crimea were supportive 
of the annexation at first due to guarantees of gaining access to the Russian mainland, as well 
as promises of new infrastructure that would connect the peninsula to the mainland. Through 
newspaper articles, it became clear that these promises were all political rhetoric by President 
Vladimir Putin and his administration, as many of these projects were never seen through or 
started. Over the past six years, the citizens of both Crimea and Russia have seen economic 
stagnation in both regions met with economic sanctions from the international community. 
Additionally, there has been a lack of political freedom as the Russian administration wants to 
ensure that the only following is that of President Putin. This research is put forth in order to 
demonstrate that the annexation has now proved to be less successful than originally hoped for 
the Russian administration, and that there should be cause of concern in the international 
community as tensions are growing within both Russian and Crimean citizens. Unfortunately, 
with President Putin creating a new constitutional amendment that would allow him to stay in 
power for another fifteen years, there is a question of how far the Russian government will go 
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The year 2014 was a turning point for several bi-lateral and multi-lateral relationships 
across the globe, specifically for Ukraine and Russia. Mid-year of 2014 is when Russian troops 
invaded the Crimea region of Ukraine and occupying the region. Their rationale of invasion was 
historical ties, and President Vladimir Putin stated that it was only the proper action to take to 
improve the lives of the people within the Crimea region. Many international entities, such as the 
United Nations, the European Union Commission, and the United States of America do not 
recognize the annexation of Crimea as it was completed by force and coercion. This paper 
discusses the historical ties of both Ukraine and Russia to Crimea, as well as view previous 
literature’s take on the annexation, and how the Crimean population’s socio-economic outcomes 
were before and after the annexation. This paper attempts to answer the following question, What 
explains the variation in support for the Russian annexation of Crimea in conjunction with 
economic and social conditions experienced by the individuals living in Crimea, then argue that 
the Russian population in Crimea, despite originally supporting the annexation of Crimea, have 
now changed their support to opposition as the annexation reaches its sixth year of external 
occupation by the Russians. Additionally, the change in the support of Russia will be examined, 
and how this affects (or lacks affect) the current Russian administration under President Vladimir 
Putin. 
Historical Background 
 Ukraine and Russia have had historical, political and economic ties for many centuries’ 
due geographical proximity, similar cultures and populations [many Russians currently live in 
Ukraine and the Crimea region] and of course, Ukraine is a previous satellite country of the former 
Union of Soviet Socialists Republics [USSR]. A visual timeline can be viewed in Appendix one. 
Crimea was a part of the Russian state from 1783, when the Tsarist Empire annexed it a 
decade after defeating Ottoman forces in the Battle of Kozludzha, until 1954, when the Soviet 
government transferred Crimea to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic [UkrSSR] (Kramer 
2020) for “managerial purposes”. During this time period, the Soviet government kept the transfer 
of Crimea very quiet from the general public of Russia and the rest of the world. This was done to 
ensure the privacy of the Russian government in light of the Cold War, especially as many 
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international actors were polarized to supporting either the United States of America or the Soviet 
Union.  
After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, a 1997 treaty with Ukraine permitted 
Russia to retain its Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol, under a “lease” that has a tentative end 
date of 2042 (Popovici 2018). This ultimately gave Russia the access needed to make a 
future overthrow of Crimea. The relationship between Ukraine and Russia during the time 
period of the 1997 treaty and the 2014 annexation has not been without its faults, but there 
seemed to be a mutual understanding that if the two countries wanted to avoid war and 
conflict, they would need to make compromises in areas such as economics, trade, politics 
and border control for their citizens. This all changed in 2014. Violent protests broke out in 
Kiev against President Victor Yanukovych’s government. These protests seemed to be fueled off 
the cancellation of an economic agreement with the European Union in favor of closer ties to 
Russia (Khrushcheva 2019). When Yanukovych fled to Russia, the Kremlin managed a forceful, 
paramilitary takeover of the Crimean Peninsula. This region had been part of the Russian Empire 
for centuries as aforementioned — Russians consider it the to be known as “Kievan Russia”, a 
proto-state of Russia and Ukraine. When President Putin returned it to the Russian control, his 
then-waning popularity skyrocketed from 60 to nearly 90 percent (Khrushcheva 2019).  
What these Russian people did not realize is when Russia illegally seized Crimea from 
Ukraine [this event violated the territorial integrity of the former USSR], and sparked a 
war that has displaced nearly 2 million people and destroyed the country’s infrastructure 
(Popovici 2018). A few days after the Crimean invasion, Russian President Vladimir Putin 
held a referendum, where the citizens of Crimea voted in favor of joining Russia. Putin 
justifies the aggression by asserting that the population Crimea is comprised mostly of 
ethnic Russians. This population, Putin cites in many interviews and rhetoric, must be given 
the same opportunities as those individuals and families within Russia’s borders and that 
despite the 1954 overturning of Crimea to Ukraine, Crimea is the right of Russia to possess. 
Interestingly, the actions of the referendum proved turbulent and any credible international 
observers for elections were absent. Local authorities reported a turnout of 83 percent, with 96.7 
percent voting in favor to join Russia. The numbers seemed unlikely and highly inflated, given 
that ethnic Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars accounted for almost 40 percent of the peninsula’s 
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population. [Two months later, a leaked report from the Russian president’s Human Rights Council 
put turnout at only 30 percent] (Pifer 2020). This should come as no surprised as Russia is 
notorious for inflating numbers to better suit their greed for international recognition and power.  
In 2020, powerful actors such as the European Union and the United States are 
continuing to place economic sanctions on the Crimea region in order to gain the Russian’s 
attention when it comes to illegal acts. Additionally, these entities do not recognize 
Moscow’s holdings on Crimea and many still consider the Crimea peninsula to be a part of 
Ukraine (Morello 2020). But Russia is not budging when it comes to releasing the Crimea 
region and signing it back over to Ukraine. The current Russian administration has 
continued making large investments within Crimea, citing that the citizens on both the 
Crimea peninsula and within Russia support these new projects of railroads, paved roads, 
importation and exportation of goods and services. 
Literature Review  
 Previous literature has demonstrated that Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 has played 
a large role in both the domestic politics of Russia and the international politics of the modern 
world. Authors have explored the political, economic and social ramifications of the Crimea 
annexation and how this may create tensions in the realm of international partnerships with Russia. 
Author Znamenshchikov discussed in his article, Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol: First 
Results of Implementation of State Programs in Economic and Social Spheres, the economic 
programs that Russia has implemented since the beginning of the annexation and how this situation 
is unique to the region. In a relatively short period of time, Crimea had to transform their current 
infrastructure, not only to reflect the Russia administration but also establish economic allegiances 
with the Russian Federation. To begin long-term integration of the Crimean region, large projects 
aimed at revamping Crimea’s economy and integration to better suit the Russian interests, 
including The Federal Target Program for Social and Economic Development of Crimea 
(developed in 2015 and is considered valid until 2022). This program includes the construction of 
electric grid facilities, including power bridge to Crimea and cable crossing through the Strait of 
Kerchen, construction of transport crossing through the Strait of Kerchen (Crimean Bridge) and 
the Federal Route Tavrida, facilities of medicine and health care, water supply, development of 
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industrial complex, improvements on access to tourism, etc. (Znamenshchikov 2019). These 
implementations appear positive to the international sector, but the main problem lies in how the 
administration in both Russia and Crimea are implementing this program and measuring its 
successes. 
Romeo-Victor Ionescu and Pierre Chabal discuss the various aspects of society (religion, 
economics, social opportunities, politics, etc.) and how these factors have been altered due to the 
ongoing Russian occupation in Crimea and intertwining these concepts with political science 
theories in their article, The Impact on Continental and Economic Issues of Russia’s Military 
Stance on Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.  The first theory that these two authors address is the 
“vital-space” theory. Foundationally, all States are in a struggle for space and seek to increase their 
territory in order to access more resources. This classic idea that States, as a rule, extend into their 
neighbors, has a countervailing significance: any State having lost territory will be driven to 
reacquire it, as if expansion was an unstoppable trend (Ionescu and Chabal 2015).  Once Russia 
lost the area of Crimea to Ukraine in 1954, their goal has been to regain this territory for not only 
political gain, but also economic opportunity and resource exploitation.  
A second theory that Ionescu and Chabal discuss that is imperative to understanding the 
current annexation situation between Russia and Crimea is “geo-economics” theory. This theory 
is characterized by the following actions: actors are viewed no longer in terms of the “rapport” to 
the territory as a power-base but of the impact of economic stability or cyclical downturns on their 
status vis-à-vis other actors (Ionescu and Chabal 2015). In other words, once Russia had gained 
the Crimean region through military force and mitigated uprising against the Russian government 
and military, they shifted their focus on economics and social aspects of Crimea.  A concept that 
the Russian administration understands is that in order to gain economic prosperity in this region, 
they must implement programs that will not only benefit the citizens of Crimea, but also Russia 
(to ensure the most support by the general public to mitigate ill-sentiments towards the 
administration). The programs that Russia has implemented are mentioned below in the “argument 
and analysis section.” A caveat to this concept is the notion of paper versus implementation. These 
programs created by the Russian government appear to be intact on paper, but implementation of 
this programs have the potential to be more harmful than helpful.  
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Author Irina Mikheeva makes several interesting points in her article, Accession of the 
Crimea Territory to Russia: the Crimea’s Inestimable Value. Mikheeva discusses the following 
points: First, the assumption is made that the occurrence of the Crimea in the economic and legal 
space of the Russian Federation has included significant investment. Secondly, this integration 
was a critical turning point in world politics that significantly altered the scope of international 
relations and the agreed-to “norms”. Finally, the annexation of Crimea into the Russian Federation 
has allowed the ruling “elite” of Russia to optimize the use of opportunities for their own 
legitimization (Mikheeva 2011). First, the accession of Crimea has given Russia the opportunity 
to make economic investments in an area that still holds a large Russian population, thus giving 
them the opportunity to “improve” the area and not receiving much backlash from the citizens. 
Secondly, by Russia annexing Crimea and the only major retaliation by the international world 
was sanctions and dropping of some (but not all) trade agreements demonstrates that Russia took 
the risk of losing trade opportunities for the accession of Crimea and decided that holding the 
territory under Russia was far more positive that Crimea encountering trade sanctions. This 
annexation demonstrated on an international scale that full isolation of the country that is 
committing the fallacy will not occur and that in the future more “buttons” will be pushed to see 
really how far an accession scheme can go. Thirdly, the annexation of Crimea has allowed the 
Russian elites to legitimize their own agenda and created a power vacuum in Russia. To the elites, 
Crimea is a “trial and error” area where they can experiment with investments, new policies and 
even social structures to see what will benefit the motherland the most, and catapult Russia into 
becoming a large international superpower for years to come.   
This previous literature has demonstrated that the annexation of Crimea may have been 
successful in theory, but in reality, has caused more harm than good. Not only is Russia attempting 
to make a lasting impact on the political climate of the Crimea region, they are also pursuing to 
mold the social and economics environments to reflect more pro-Russian sentiments and actions. 
Russia has demonstrated to the international world that they will make drastic choices in order to 
maintain their global influence. By reflecting on these previous theories and observations, it is 
apparent that the divide between Crimea and Russia is much more than surface level. This 
annexation not only caused tensions economically, but culturally and politically. All social classes 
between the elite administration to the working classes of industry and agriculture within Crimea 
feel the increased Russian influence on all aspects of their life: the success of the economy go back 
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into Russia to inflate their own economy with the outside revenue, the Russian military is stationed 
along border zone and large waterways to ensure individuals and families are not attempting to 
flee Crimea and sneak back to Ukraine, and most importantly, politics have drastically been 
saturated with Russian influence. Crimean officials now have to answer the heads of government 
back in Moscow and ensure that their actions are not “stepping on the toes” of the motherland.   
Argument & Analysis 
 Social media [Facebook, twitter] and news platforms play a large role in how information 
is spread across the world. Statistics can be inflated; quotes can be misspoken, and false 
information can lead to conflict. This warping of information, whether it is intentional or not, had 
led to the questioning of the Crimea Annexation by Russia as it is almost six years to the date of 
the Russian invasion of the peninsula.  
 In Russia’s eyes, the annexation of Crimea was not to gain spheres of influence over factors 
of society, such as economy and politics. Russia’s leaders truly believed that the Crimea territory 
was legally an area of Russia and that the notion of Ukraine categorizing it as theirs was illegal 
and wrong. The caveat is that President Vladimir Putin is well aware of the international rules and 
regulations when it comes to accessing and/or acquiring an outside territory. In international law, 
Conquest is the acquisition of territory through force, An effective conquest takes place when 
physical appropriation of territory [annexation] is followed by “subjugation” [i.e., the legal process 
of transferring title] (Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica 2007). The doctrine of conquest and its 
derived rules is contrary to international law, a view that is expressed in  the following critical 
internationally recognized documents: the covenant of the League of Nations, the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact of 1928, the judgments of the international military tribunals created at the end of World War 
II, and the Charter of the United Nations. The statements regarding aggressive conquest and how 
these actions break international law were placed in the Stimson Doctrine (1932), published in 
January 1932 and subsequently agreed upon by the assembly of the League of Nations.  
Additionally, The Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States (1949), was created by the 
International Law Commission of the United Nations. This document contained [in Article 11] the 
rule that states are obligated not to recognize territorial acquisitions achieved by aggressive war 
(Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica 2007). Thus, Putin was aware that his annexation of Crimea 
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was considered illegal by international actors around the world, including the United States of 
America, the European Union, and the United Nations. 
 Barclay Ballard of World Finance published an article in October of 2019 updating the 
world on how the Crimean region is “holding up” since the Russian invasion, and how the 
implications of territorial and economic conquest have larger influences than many people think. 
Ballard made the following statement, the peninsula’s success, however, is a little misleading. 
Since 2014, Moscow has provided huge sums of money for the Crimean economy, funding a 
number of large infrastructure projects of high value. This expenditure has not only created the 
pretense of prosperity – “it has also proved a monumental drain on Russia’s finances at a time 
when international sanctions are beginning to bite” (Ballard 2019). In other words, Crimea’s 
success is demonstrated on paper with statistics that may have been altered [as that has been a 
characteristic in the past of the Russian administration] and in reality, there has been promised 
projects not completed and growing sentiments on both sides of the Black Sea that citizens are 
unhappy with Russia’s annexation. Industries such as tourism, fishing, manufacturing and banking 
have been affected negatively since the annexation took place, as many international entities such 
as the United States of America, Ukraine and even the European Union have ceased trading 
relationships with Crimea due to the Russia annexation.  
 The administration in Moscow has built a new airport in Simferopol and as 
aforementioned, connected Crimea to the Russian mainland with a 1.4-mile suspension bridge over 
the Kerch Strait. Crimea’s economy experienced extremely fast growth in 2019—at least 
according to data collated by the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (a think tank with close 
ties to the Kremlin). By 2022, on the institute’s projections, Moscow will have plowed $13 billion 
into the territory (Smith 2019). If you look between the lines, this new-found wealth for the 
peninsula is not evenly spread. While Crimea’s construction and manufacturing sectors have 
expanded by twenty percent since 2018, sectors such as agriculture, retail, and tourism have grown 
far less, with statistics being recorded at most an improvement by three percent. Outside the often-
corrupt elite, private enterprise has collapsed, and ninety percent of small businesses have closed 
and filed for bankruptcy since 2014 (Smith 2019). Despite there being trade embargos on the 
Crimean Peninsula, economic hardships for small business owners, and even Russian citizens 
living in Crimea are encountering difficulties crossing the borders into Russia [when ease of access 
was promised], there are many people in Crimea who support the annexation of Crimea by the 
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Russians. But, as the new year has begun, this massive support that was once displayed in the 
earlier side of this decade has now fizzled out.  
 The reality of the matter is that Russia does not acknowledge the sectors that have become 
stagnant or has produced negative growth. In the eyes of the Putin’s administration, the holding of 
Crimea for the past six years has demonstrated to the world that Russia can withstand international 
sanctions and also maintains a strong military presence in the eastern bloc of the European region. 
Over the past six years, the aggressive nationalistic tendencies of Russian citizens, especially over 
the Crimean annexation, have faded away as concerns of economic prosperity keep them up at 
night and lack of production has led them to worry about where their next meal is coming from 
(Khrushcheva 2019). 
 For Crimea, the annexation has proved to be disappointing over the past six years. The 
initial support for Russia’s invasion and administration was based off the promised ideas and 
projects to positively boost the economy and political spheres of the Crimean region to the point 
that they would no longer need Ukraine or the European Union for support. Now, six years later, 
the support has disappeared as the result of this promises are mostly a ruse.  
 Crimea has undergone significant changes over the past six years. A large number of ethnic 
Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars — close to 140,000 — have left the peninsula since 2014 (Pifer 
2020). Crimean Tatars state that intimidation and oppression as one of the main reasons for moving 
out of the region. During the same period, around 250,000 individuals have moved from Russia to 
Crimea (Pifer 2020); The inflow has included troops and sailors, as the Kremlin has bolstered the 
Russian military presence on the peninsula, deploying new submarines, surface combatants and 
combat aircraft among other things. This is an important concept to understand as this influx of 
troops and sailors from Russia means that Russia can keep an eye on the borders and waterways 
between these two occupations. Unfortunately, this influx of persons has caused Crimean persons 
to lose their jobs in both the military and fishing industries.  
The economic situation currently in Crimea leaves a sour taste in the mouths of Russians 
and Cremains alike. Trying to create a success story, Moscow has poured in more than $10 billion 
in direct subsidies as well as funding major construction and infrastructure projects as those 
aforementioned. On the other hand, small business has suffered, particularly with the decline in 
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tourism, which once accounted for about one quarter of Crimea’s economy (Pifer 2020). Tourism 
was previously seen as a very profitable sector of the economy as many cruises and tour companies 
would place stops on the Crimea territory. Crimea also remains subject to a variety of Western 
economic sanctions, including those from the European Union and the United States of America. 
Though these countries do not want Crimea to drown from isolation and economic downturn, they 
are also trying to make a political statement to Russia, demonstrating that illegal actions such as 
the annexation will not be tolerated. 
Over the past six years, the support for President Vladimir Putin has declined in both 
Crimea and on mainland Russia. This is due to both regions experience economic stagnation and 
lack of political freedom. Despite this lack of support, President Putin, and with the Kremlin- 
controlled Duma, passed a constitutional amendment this year that would allow Putin to remain in 
power until 2036 (Staglin 2020). Thus, the original regulations of two-term presidential limit have 
been thrown out. This political move by President Putin did not sit well with many of Russia’s 
citizens, and there have been calls for protests and resistance. In April 2020, Russia will be holding 
a vote for the public on this new constitutional amendment. But, viewing the previous inflation of 
numbers and statistics by the Russian government, I do not think it would be a surprise if the 
numbers were reported to favor Putin and this new constitutional amendment. Additionally, there 
could be little opportunity to review these statistics as President Putin has control on many 
organizations and institutions related to the Russian government and political sphere. 
Future implications of this annexation 
 As more time passes from the original invasion by the Kremlin, more sentiments of ill-will 
and resistance will start to grow on both sides of the Black Sea. The lack of stable employment for 
many sectors within Crimea is one of the biggest concerns of citizens living on the peninsula. This 
is due to the notion that generations have “made their living” off certain industries, such as fishing 
and tourism. Now with these industries largely sectored to Russian-born citizens from the 
motherland, or they are completely diminished due to international sanctions, the frustration and 
weariness is growing. Furthermore, international sanctions placed on the region has stagnated 
growth as well (Ayres 2019). With no income, many individuals and families are struggling to pay 
for groceries, house mortgages, or electricity bills. The danger of having a growing rates of 
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individuals and families that cannot sustain themselves economically is then that region’s economy 
will eventually collapse. Especially for Crimea’s situation, they will then become fully reliant on 
Russia, first economically, and then following politically and socially. The international 
community may view this skewed situation as colonialism [though may be different as many 
persons living on the peninsula are of Russia descendent] and the international world order has 
frowned upon colonialism since the Europeans gave up their colonial ties in Africa between the 
1960s and late 1980s. But, the international community, including entities such as the United 
States, the European Union, and even singular member states as Ukraine, have restrained from 
intervening because there is potential of this situation becoming a catalyst for yet another World 
War.  
 Socially and politically, the Crimean Peninsula has undergone a transformation in the past 
six years and will continue to change as long as the Russian administration is the head of how 
cultural aspects of the region are handled. At the beginning of the annexation, citizens of Crimea 
were offered “perks” of Russia, but no one was told the process of applying for a Russian passport 
and the subsequent events to be classified as equal to those of their Russian counterparts would be 
confusing, there would be lack of information and long lines awaiting those that attempted the 
process. Politically, the structure of government would be a “puppet” government where they need 
to answer to President Putin’s cabinet and orders, as in his eyes Crimea is a part of the mainland 
Russia, and he still has autonomous power over them.  
 There is no playbook on how this situation will play out in the future. Questions will 
continue to arise: will Russia give up the Crimean Peninsula if the international sanctions 
continue? Will there be another revolution from the Crimean citizens? How much pressure and 
control by the Russian administration considered too much? With the information that is currently 
available, it is known that the economic health of the Crimean Peninsula is stagnant and in danger 
of going into a long-term recession. This is due to aforementioned factors, such as the international 
sanctions placed on large trading partners, such as the European Union and the United States. 
Additionally, many jobs have been outsourced to Russian-born citizens or have completely vanish 
due to the annexation. Sectors such as tourism has seen a rapid decline due to many borders and 
ports being blocked by the Russian military to outside visitors and tourists. Socially, many 
individuals and families know they will be punished if they speak out against the Russian 
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government, and many news reports from international sources will leave out identifying 
information to protect persons that interview for fear of retaliation by the Russian government. In 
conjunction with social aspects, political freedom has been tightened with this annexation. 
Everything is run from Moscow, and those on the peninsula know that they must follow those 
orders to ensure their personal safety and the safety of the community. 
 As the international entities, such as the European Union, China, the United States of 
America, and even Russia are attempting to balance soft and hard power, there is potential for the 
European Union to gain more political influence from these other entities and command enough 
hard power through mechanisms [as they do not have their own European military but have access 
to member states’ military commands]. This gain of political influence may spark the international 
community to back the European Union, specifically with Ukraine, to take back the Crimean 
Peninsula. There is a hope that this action would be done peacefully as to demonstrate that illegal 
invasion and annexation are frowned upon by global actors. But there is always potential for 
escalation due to the notion that the annexation occurred under forceful and aggressive measures. 
Territorial disputes are difficult to resolve in nature, but the question many political scientists and 
governments alike in regard to the Crimea Peninsula is how long the international world stand by 
while Russia holds onto Crimea with empty promises and tensions rising.  
Conclusion  
It is difficult as an outsider to fully comprehend what an individual or family endures while 
living on the Crimean Peninsula. To have the Russian government invade and take everything 
from your world and turn it upside-down is unimaginable, especially because Russia is aggressive 
in many things outside of their military. I can only imagine how frustration and heart-breaking it 
must be to these people that after six years of illegal occupation, the Russian government and 
military have not accomplished many of the infrastructure, resources and funding that they stated 
was going to occur after the initial annexation. 
To the international world, the illegal annexation of Crimea is a disgrace to the reputation 
of post-Cold War Russia. Despite the numerous treaties and agreements that the Russian state 
signed into effect and even maintained after the formal destruction of the USSR, President 
Vladimir Putin still made the conscious decision to illegally invade the Crimean Peninsula in 
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March of 2014. Russian citizens were favorable of this invasion as President Putin declared that 
the territory was rightful property of the motherland, and that there was going to economic 
opportunities for many Russian citizens on the Peninsula. Similarly, many Crimean citizens were 
favorable of a Pro-Russian state as the then current Ukrainian President had fled the country. 
Additionally, the Russian administration had made many promises to the citizens of Crimea, 
among them including opportunities for employment, economic prosperity and Russian 
citizenship. Being six years out from the illegal annexation, it is clear to state on both sides that 
the support for territorial claims in Crimea has diminished. Many of the projects, funding and 
resources that were promised on both sides [to Russian citizens and Crimea citizens] were either 
poorly constructed or never carried out in the first place. Russia started becoming more focused 
on outside relationships, such as with China and the United States of America. Russian and 
Crimean citizens alike were questioning when they would experience the employment 
opportunities, economic prosperity or political freedom that Vladimir Putin so vehemently 
preached across various social media platforms as well in the streets of Moscow and Sevastopol. 
Unless the Russian administration starts to “practice what they preach,” the future of the Crimean 

















Note on Appendix 1: In this timeline, you can see important dates that constitutes the 
relationship between Russia and Ukraine, specifically the Crimean Peninsula. Additionally, it 












References (APA Format) 
Ayres, S. (2019, January 28). Four years after Russia annexed Crimea, the peninsula remains in 
limbo. Retrieved March 26, 2020, from https://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-crimea-20190128-
story.html 
Ballard, B. (2019, October 28). Crimea doesn’t pay: assessing the economic impact of Russia 
annexation. Retrieved March 9, 2020, from https://www.worldfinance.com/special-
reports/crimea-doesnt-pay-assessing-the-economic-impact-of-russias-annexation 
Ionescu, R.-V., & Chabal, P. (2015). he Impact on Continental and Economic Issues of Russia’s 
Military Stance on Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. Acta Universitatis Danubius. 
Œconomica, 11(2), 107–133. 
Khrushcheva, N. (2019, March 18). Russia's Crimea invasion was good for Putin. But five years 
later, the nationalist glow is gone. Retrieved March 26, 2020, from 
https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/russia-s-crimea-invasion-was-good-putin-five-years-
later-ncna984431 
Kramer, M. (2019). Why Did Russia Give Away Crimea Sixty Years Ago? Retrieved March 10, 
2020, from https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/why-did-russia-give-away-crimea-sixty-
years-ago 
Mikheeva, I. (2017). Accession of the Crimea Territory to Russia: the Crimea’s Inestimable 
Value. Sravnitelʹnai͡ a  Politika (Moscow, Russia), 8(4), 83–94. 
Morello, C. (2020, January 29). Trump administration issues new sanctions related to Russia's 
takeover of Crimea. Retrieved March 10, 2020, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-
security/trump-administration-issues-new-sanctions-related-to-russias-takeover-of-
crimea/2020/01/29/062fbf02-42c6-11ea-aa6a-083d01b3ed18_story.html 
Pifer, S. (2020, March 17). Crimea: Six years after illegal annexation. Retrieved March 26, 2020, 
from https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/03/17/crimea-six-years-after-
illegal-annexation/ 
Popovici, A. (2018, August 30). Why Russia Wants Crimea. Retrieved March 10, 2020, from 
https://www.history.com/news/crimea-russia-ukraine-annexation 
Smith, H. L. (2019, June 18). They Cheered Russian Rule. Now Some Have Buyer's Remorse. 
Retrieved March 7, 2020, from https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/06/some-
crimeans-who-cheered-russia-have-buyers-remorse/591739/ 
Stanglin, D. (2020, March 11). Russian President Vladimir Putin's bid to stay in office until 2036 






The Economist. (2015, June 4). Crisis in Ukraine. Retrieved March 27, 2020, from 
https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2015/06/04/crisis-in-ukraine 
The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica. (2007, September 24). Conquest. Retrieved March 26, 
2020, from https://www.britannica.com/topic/conquest-international-law 
Znamenshchikov, O. (2019). Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol: First Results of 
Implementation of State Programs in Economic and Social Spheres. Управленческое 
Консультирование, 10, 100. https://doi.org/10.22394/1726-1139-2019-10-100-109 
	
